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Internationally, The 21st Century Is No Time for the United 
States to Be Gambling With the Economy: Taxpayers 
Subsidizing the Gambling Industry and the De Facto Elimination 
of All Casino Tax Revenues via the 2002 Economic Stimulus Act 
JOHN W ARREN KINDT' 
1 lNrRODUCTION 
A. The Gambling Industry and Taxation by Terrorism 
Some main concerns about gambling issues involve taxing policies for 
the Slate and federal governments. and these concerns were raised. for 
example, in 1995 regarding whether governments were achieving any ner new 
tax. revenues from legali zing gambling activities. ' In a counterproductive 
• ProfessQl'. Univenily of Ulmois. A.B., William and Mary. 1972: 1.0. 1976. MBA 1917, 
UniVCBi ly of Georgia , ll.M. 1918. SJD 198 1. Universi ty of Vi rginia. John Wanen Kindl is I professor 
al the University of ntinois at Urbana-Champaigo. A facu lty member since 1978, he leaches eourses in 
commerce and legal policy. Erin Stieber. Melissa Jordan. and Katie Cook provided ~aluabk as~istance in 
updui ng. editing. and cite-checking thi s article. The aulhorfed.!tors of this article have attempted to delete 
references and source materials tOO heavily influenced by pro-gambling interests or other speclll interests 
unless identified M such. For an analysis of public concerns in these is~ue areas, sec John W. Kindt. Tht 
COSIS of Addicltd C",,,b/us; Should Iht SWIt!S Inlliale Meg"·u, •• ,,,ull.· Similar 10 Ihe ToiHKCQ Clut's? 
22 MANAGhl(tAL & D~:CISKlN EcoN. 17, 19-2 1,27-28, 31-32 (2001 ). 
I . John W. Kindt. ugaUud G"mbllng ACliviliuDS SuhsiJlud by T'I.1/1(I)'t'rs, 48 ARK. L REV. 
8l:!9 (1995) [herem after Gambling SubJidiudJ; Uti (liso Tony Bait, Tax 8r~okfor Slols OK'd: Meosur~ 
Will UI Companiu lkducl Technological/£xptllSes, I.. .... SVEQAS REV. J., Oct. 16,2001. at I [hereinafter 
Tax Breakfor SlouJ. Su generally National Gambling Impact & Policy COII",, 'n ACI: Hearjllg on H.R. 
497 Befo~ the House Comm. on Ihe Judiciary. 100th Cong. ( 1995) (statement of Tom Grey, Executive 
Director Nat·1 Coalillon Agllinsll.egaliz.cd Gambling (quOfing Profeuor John WllTen KindT» [hereinafter 
Om/jre$$IQn(I/ Gamblin/j Htaring /995]. John W. Kindt & Anne E.e. Brynn. Dtmllctil·t £Collomie 
Policies", Ihe Agt of Ttrrorism: GQITmmml-SanClioned Gambling as ElK'Ouragillg Translx>undry 
EcOl1omJC Ruil/"" ",,,llJeswbilivng NatiOflal and lnUmoliOflQ/ Economitl, 16 TEMI'U! t"l"L& COM/'. 
W . 243 (2002) [hereinafler wmbilng Dtswbilivng EcolWnliesJ. 
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political response [0 the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September II, 200 1, New York Governor George E. Palaki 's solution to 
generate new state tax revenues was to push legislation for several new 
casinos through the legislature2-although that same proposal had been stalled 
fo r years due to adverse costlbenefit analyses and although State Senator 
Frank Padavan was "convinced" that Palaki's casino legislation was 
unconstitutional.) Thereafter, the legislation was almost immediately 
challenged in court.4 
In a "fast-track and no debate" maneuver, which gambling lobbyists had 
successfully manipulated in other states such as Indiana, the eighty-one page 
New York legislation was "approved after midnight with less than an hour' s 
debate."s Challenging this legislation, the plaintiffs attorney, Cornelius D. 
Murray, made three major claims in the lawsuit, arguing that 
the legislation violates a state constitUlional provision banning 
commercial gambling; the only real reason for the bill was to bail out 
the horse·racing industry, and such a use does not qualify for an 
exception to the gambling ban; and a multi·state provision is 
unconstitutional because it would allow proceeds to cross state lines.6 
The lawsuit also complained of the deceptive procedural maneuvers by 
pro-gambling interests. The New York Law Journal summarized the lawsuit 
as follows. 
[t]he proposed legislation was not subjected to committee study: there 
were no public hearings and no opportunity whatsoever for input by 
the average citizen, according to the lawsuit. Instead, the impetus for 
the bill came from powerful gambling interests who mounted one of 
the broadest, most expensive lobbying campaigns in state history in 
order to obtain passage. 
Further. the bill had not been on the desks of lawmakers for three 
days, as usually required under Article ill §14 of the State 
2. Rich:ud Perez-Pefia, Ga",bling Bill jl Qutltio"td on COIlstitutioool Grounds, N.Y. T1MI'.s. 
Oct. 26. 2001, al 06: Ue also Gambling lHstabilizjng Economits, supra !\Ole I. 
3. Pcru-Pc~a, supra note 2, al 06; Stt N.Y. CONsr., art. L § 9 (pro!'nbiting glmbling excepl 
parimuhlcl .... ageri ng on horses and loW-Slakes games by charitable groups). 
4. Jonn Caner. (i(:lmbling uguwfjon AtfQCktd; OpP'OntmJ CluJlltn8t SubSlonc~ oll.m<' alld 
ProctSJ by Which it M'OS Posud. N.Y. LJ.. Ja/!. 30. 2002. al I: !Itt PefCX-PeIia. supra nOk 2. III 06. 
S. Caner. supra DOle 4. 
6. Id. 
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Constitution. Instead, it came accompanied with a "message of 
necessity" from Governor Pataki.7 
365 
Similarly. the Washington, D.C. lobbyists for the gambling industry 
seized on the 9- 11 terrorist anack to pass legislation giving all gambling 
facilities using video gambling machines and similar devices a tax write-off 
worth a combined $40 billions-according to its sponsor U.S. Representative 
Jerry Weller,9 the head of the House Gaming Caucus in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 'o This $40 billion tax write-off was equivalent to 
approximately all of the federal and state tax revenues received from all U.S. 
legalized casino gambling during the 1990s (for example, 2001 was the 
"highest" tax year at $3.6 billion in direct casino gaming taxes),11 The Las 
Vegas media appeared to brag aoout the gambling industry's influence in the 
U.S. Congress. 12 which could achieve this $40-billion tax credit for the 
gambling industry as part of the 2002 Economic Stimulus Bill. n 
Via hi s membership on the House Ways and Means Committee, 
Representative Weller "originally sought a 100 percent deduction for 
technological equipment within the first year of purchase.,,14 However, 
"[w]hen the committee chairman, Rep. Bill Thomas, R-Catif.. balked at a 
complete deduction, Weller setlled for a 30 percent cut, aides said. The 30 
percent deduction will cost the federal government $40 billion the first year 
it goes into effect, according to Weller spokesman Ben Fallon.'·ls 
In comparison to this $40 billion tax gift to the gambling industry. 16 the 
Ford Motor Company was criticized for perhaps being able to benefit by 
$2 billion l1 in the Economic Stimulus package, IS and the entire 2001 budget 
of the Center for Disease Control (COC) was only $4.2 billion l9 even though 
1. Id. (i nternal qUOl&tions omitted): sualso Shalla K. [)e"'an. Public UVtJ: Fighting Gombling. 
WhIle Keeping Hu H(md ;n. N.Y. TlMfS. May 14. 2002, at 82. 
8. Tw:BreakforSlou, supro note 1. 
9. M. 
10. Id. 
II . S~e ge"uallyEugene MartinChrisriansc:n &Sebaslian Sinclair. U.S, Growlh H(l(e DiWPINinIS. 
INT'LGI\MIN(l & W i\OEl!INO Bus., Aug. 2001, at 1, 32. (1990s annoal rewnoe and lax estimates); Doug 
Yoong. u.s. C(J.fillo Growth Slow! 10 Decade-low in ZOO/. REUTERS COMPA,NY NEWS. M~y 8. 2002 
(~poning 2001 lUes on casinos), (JlI(jilable at http://casinonews.orglllJ'ChiveJAA-AID=1236.htm1. 
12. Tax Break/or Siou. supro nOle 1. 
13. Job Crellion and WOlt.cr Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 101-147. 116 Slat. 21 (2002) 
[hereinafter 2002 Economic Stimulus Bill]. 
14. Tax BrtakforSlou. supro nole I. 
1~ . Ill. 
16. Ill. 
17. Su generally 2002 Economic Slimulus 8il1. supra nOh~ 13. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
-"14 
: --- -
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(he CDC was charged with combating the anthrax scare and other potential 
terrorism via diseases.2O 
B. The J999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
In 1996 the U.S. Congress created the U.S. National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission (NOISe or 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission)2] (0 review 
gambling activities throughout the United States because few states had 
prepared comprehensive costlbenefit analyses of the social and economic 
impacts of encouraging more licensed gambling activities,n The analyses 
examined both slow gambling activities (such as bingo) and fast gambling 
activities (such as video gambling. including Internet gambling). As the speed 
of the gambling activities increase, the money is lost faster and the 
soc ioeconomic negatives increase dramatically?) The 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission issued its Final Report in 1999 and confirmed that the U.S. 
gambling industry had created: (I) new ~ddicted gamblers, (2) new 
Qankruptcies. and (3) new £rime and £orruption (the ABC's of legalized 
gambling). 24 The 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission unanimously called for 
a moratorium on the expansion of U.S. gambli ng. a II also called for the 
recriminaJization of all "convenience gambling" in stores, particularly by 
video gambling machines,M which were identified all the "crack cocaine" of 
creati ng flew pathologicaJ (addicted) gamblers.27 The Commission also 
condemned gambling on the Internet, :!lI which was even supported by the U.S. 
20. fd. 
21. Nalionll Gambling lmpKIStudyCommissionAct. Pub. L No. 104-169. § 3. I IOSlat. 1482-83 
(19%), atMndtdby Pub. L No. 105-30. II. III Stat. 248 (1997). 
22. Su, e.N .. ROHERT GoooMAN. l£GAUZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR ECO:-lOMIC 
Dt;VELO~1IlN7 ( 1994) [hcreinaflerCED REroRTJ. Su generally John W. Kindt , Would H.t·CrjmlllolizinfJ 
U.s. GombUnfJ Pllmp-Pri~ rhe Economy ond Could U.S. Gomb/lllg Foci/iliu Bt Tr(lIujormed 1'1/0 
EducatiQntl/ oml High-Ttch Facililils? WiIllht ugaf DiJcovtry oj GlI/nb/ms ComPl,mes' Secrtl$ 
Confirm Rt$tarch IUlllS? 8 STAt-iFORD j,L. BUS. & FIN. 169 (2003) Ihereinpfler G<lmblinfJ FfJcililiet 
Trcmsjor'"td into Educmiom,f Focililiet]' 
23. Prof, JOOn Wam:n Kindt. U.S. lind inh:matiQlllll Concem~ over the Socio-Eoonomic Costs of 
Legaliwl Gambling: Grealer Ihan lhe megal Drug Problem' (siatemeni 10 the Nalional Gambling Impact 
Sludy Commission) (May 21. 1998) [hereinafter U.S. and InlemalionalCosts). SCI! Chart I injro. 
24. NAT'LOAMBUNG IMPACT Sl1JDY COMM'N, FINAL Rf!PORT (June 1999) [hereinafler NOISC 
FIN AL REPORT]. 
25. fd. ; NAT'L GAM8lJNG IMPACT STUDY CO~\!'N. EX!'.ClfTJ"'" SUMMARY (June 1999) 
(inWxluclion by Oilir Kay C. Jamu) /hereinafter NGISe EXECUTIVE SUMMARY). 
26. NOISC EXF.ClllWE SUMMARY, supra note 25. rec. )·6. 
21. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 24. al 7·23. 
28. NGISCExf.CUTIVE SUMMARY. $Ilpra J\Q(e 25. KoCS. 5-1. 5-2. 5-3. & ,-4. Sit JOOn W. Kindt 
&: Stephen W. Joy.lnurMr Gambling (lJuJ rht ~:mWiJitllrion oj NatiONlI tJtu/ /1tI(nwrional EcoflOlrlilS: 
Ti~jora COIItprthtltSi~ Ban 011 Gombling Over mt World Widt Wth. 80 DeNv. U.L. REV. I II (2002) 
[hcfeinaftcr lkJrabilitlllion oj Economits), 
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gambling industry. However. in 2001 !he gambling industry reversed its 
position "180 degrees," supporting legislative approval of Internet gambl ing 
in Nevada and began to promote lntemet gambling,29 even though it was still 
illegal under federal U.S.law,30 regardless of any Nevada legislation. When 
California legalized the medicinal use of marijuana in 1996, the U,S. Justice 
Department still stated it was a "federal crime" and would prosecute anyone 
who tried to hide behind this California law.31 In 2001, U.S. AnomeyGenerai 
John Ashcroft was urged to adopt a similar policy toward any Las Vegas 
companies trying to hide behind Nevada state legislation allowing Internet 
gambling.n 
D. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS 
A. The ABCs of Gambling 
The gambling industry's own reports conceded that between 1994 and 
1997 the spread of legalized gambling had conservatively created: 
1. an add itional .5 percent of the public or 1.5 million new 
pathological (addicted) gamblers)) costing society/taxpayers 
$10,000 to $52,000 per year in costs per gambler; l4 
29. Mati R1dllel, Uu V~,as Casinos, in Shift oj PosiliDII. Bode Onlin~ &mng. N.Y, Tt."IES. May 
17.2001, at AI; K~ ,~n~rolly fNuabi/itp/Wn of EcO#Ionritl. s"Pro note 28. 
30. TIle WireA.tt. 18 U.S.C,' 1084 (2(0); IU o/SlJ lNslabilitptiOfl ojEc01lOflVts. Sl4pra note28. 
31. Su, t.I" Tran$Clipl ,,(Online Newshour, "[)eIcrimmaliud MmjUlna." Nov. 7, 1996. When 
commenti ng Ofllhe passage of California's Proposition 21S aliowinJlhe medicinol useof manJusnll when 
recommended by I physician. U.S, Attorney General Janet Reno warned "the rt:qUlremenls of foderallaw 
are lIilI in plaoe. alld it .. ill beeaforad. and people shoukl be advl-t ofINt." rd. 
32. Tooy Balt. lnl~rndGomblin,: CrillCl$ukCrac/( Down: GlVMp CiJllsfor JUUIU lNparrmml 
Acrlon , L.\s VEGoU REVJ., June 9. 2001, al D); U~ Fred Faust . Official Sub Itsltcroft Mutin" LAs 
VEOoU REV. I ., June 7, 2001, at 01 . 
)). HoWARD J. SHAF~l:::R '" At.., EsnMATING THE PREVAl£NCE OF D ISORDERED GAMIIUNG 
B£HIWIOR IN THE UNfTEO STAn:~ .. AS D CANADA: A META'ANALYSIS 43. tb1. I); 51, Ib1. 16 ( 1997) 
[hereinarter HARVARD AODtCTJONS META·ANALYStS): Press Release. Harvard Medical School, ~Harvard 
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in Nonh America" (0«. 4, 1997) 
(From .84 percent in 1993 ' 'the: prevalence nle for 1994-1997 grew 10 1.29 percenl of !he adull 
populalion.M ) (hereinafta' Harvard Divisioo on Addictions PTcu RdeaK): IU gt~rally Gomblillg 
Facilitin TnmsforrnttJ into U/IICotional FQCilirUI, supro note 22. 
34. Su, ~., .. ALCOHOl.&: DRUC ABUSE AOMtN., MD. DliP'THEALTH & MENT ...... HYQIE. .. E, TASK 
foRCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 59-61 (1990) (hereinafter GAMDLlNG ADDICTION IN 
MARVl.ANO); JDhn W, Kindt. rh~ Cosf1of Addi(ltd Cambial: Should Iht SraftllnitiClt~ Mtga·lAwsuits 
S"r"IQrtolh~ Tabo«o Caul? 22 MANAGEJl.w..&: DOClSlOsEcQN. 17, tbl. A3 (200 1) (hereinaficr M~gCl' 
!.oM'SUIII). 
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2. an additional 2 percent of the public or 3.5 mil1ion new 
"problem" gamblers15 costi ng society/taxpayers $2,000 to 
$10.000 per year in costs per gambler:36 
3. new bankruptcies in counties with gambling, averaging 18 to 
35 percent increases overall by 199737 and con tinuing at 13 to 
19 percent into 2001 ;38 and 
4. new crime increasing in counties with gambling (particularly 
casino counties), up an average 9 percent in the third ~ear after 
the advent of casinos and £rending upward thereafter. 9 
U.S. studies of the percentages of teenagers who have becomepathologi-
cal (addicted) and problem gamblers are double the numbers for adu llS.40 
Therefore, throughout the 19908, gambling legislators have addicted millions 
of teenagers to gambling, which sociologists compare to drug addiction and 
which future leaders will have to combat similarly to the "War on DrugS."41 
The gambling addict ion problem was highlighted by a 1997 University 
of Cali fomi a study that revealed suicide rales (which would include teenagers) 
in gambling counties were at least two to four times greater than in 
non-gambling counties.42 
35. H,o,RVAAO AOOlCllONS META-ANAlYSIS. supra note 33. at 43. tbl. 13; 5 1. tbl. 16. 
36. CcmfNl" ""tgll·Ww!uifs. supra nQ(e 34, tbls. A3-A9 (shoWiIlI ranges of costs estmla\ed by 
various experts/5tudies). wllh NGlSC FINAl REPoRT. supra nQ(e 24. at 4·1 4 (coo5el'\·'tive and partl,1 COSIs). 
37. SMRRESEAACII CQRP .• nlEP!;R$ONAlBANKRUPTCYCRISI5, 1997. 119(1997) (commissioned 
by the banking/credi t oommumty. Am. Banken Assoc.) (hereinafter BAS KR,UPTCY CRlSls1: Ntw NllllOnol 
SludyShuws Comdolitl/1 fhrwt'tn Gombling Gruwlh WId Iht Significllnl1i.ISt in Pus(ffl(J18cm/(rupICltS. 
BUSINESS Wnu;, June 27, 1997 (hereinafter Correl(1/i(ffl 8 t fM.·un Gomblmg GroMh and Ba,,/(ruplclu1: 
Ut (lIS{) lohn W. Kindt & lohn K Pakhd. ugllliuJ GwrtbJlI1gs lhSlllbdi'llllio" of U.S. Fmanciul 
Insli'IIIimu UIIJ Ih~ &mk;nll "uluslry: Issu~s in 8ankrupu:y. Crtdil. amJ S"cial Norm Prut/uctiQll. 19 
EMQRY U BoI.NKR. DEV. 1. 21 (2002) [hereinaf."'r Gomb/intl 's Deswb;lhflliool of Fmmu:itlf ("slilullOns]. 
38. Su SMR R ESE-"RCH CORP .• THE NEW B AN KRUPTCY EPI DE MIC 207 (2001 ) [hereinafter 
B ANKR UPTCY EPIilEMIC ]: u£ a/su cnmw/i"E's DeslabiliZUlim. of Financial ftuliIUliOl~<, SUI}ru note 37. 
39. Earl L. Gri nols et al., Casilws and Cril1U! (200 1) (submittled for publication); su (llso lohn W. 
Kindt . T"~ F(lllu r£ 10 R~gu/ate III~ Gambling Industry Elftcti1J~ly: Il!allliv~s for Pupetll(J/ N(III_ 
Complio"Ct. 27 S. IL'" U. I_I. 219 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling fndumy Pupu ual Non-COlllplicIlIctl: 
DtSttibifiurtloll ojEco.wmlu. supra note 28; Gambling's DeMabiliurtion of FinanciJIllnstituli01l5. supra 
note 37. 
40, Su. t.g .. Durand F. Jacob~.l1Itg(l/ tl1Id Urulbcuntl!nltd: A Rt vit ... OfTttnogt Gambling and 
Iht Pllghl o/Childrtn of Probltm Gambltn In Amuica. in CO~'PULS IVEG"'MO llNCi: THEORY. RI:.SE.ARCH . 
A .... [) PRACTICE 249 (Ho\lo-ard J. ShafTer et aI. leds" 1989). 
41. John W. Kindt. U.S. Na tional Secu rity and tht Strategic Economic Bose: Tlrt Buslnus! 
Economic JntpOcts ofTht i..tgoli;:,aliUl/ of GambUng Activities. 39 ST. Lou,s U. LJ. 567. 583 (1995) 
(hereinafter Slral~gic £CUl/omic 8/.1s~ l . 
42. Su David P. Phtllips et aI .• Eltv(lud Suicldt Ltvtls Alsociolt d w/lh u8aliud Gamblmg. 27 
SUICIDE & LJFE·nUtrATES1SG BEHAV 373. 376-n. & tbl. 2 (1997) n.&$ Vegas"he J>rC'rnoer U.S. 
a:ambhnl 9Cttinl. dIsplays the highest levels of suicide In the nalton."). 
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No one is immune from gambling addiction including judges. 
government officials. legislators. FBI agents. and police officials. For 
example. within weeks of the opening of the Detroit casinos, onc sen ior police 
official became hooked, lost his money, and killed himself with his service 
revolver after losing at a casino blackjack table.43 
In 1998, the legal counsel for Joliet, Illinois testified before the National 
Gamblinglmpact Study Commission that casino gambling had only benefited 
Joliet with no downside • .u but his testimony was refuted when a 
Commissioner confronted him with the Los Angeles Times article "Lives Lost 
in a River of Debt" that highlighted the alarming number of gambling~related 
suicides around Joliet4S The causes of several of these suicides remained 
hidden until the coroner's office issued subpoenas to the local casinos and 
linked several suicides to gambling losses46- including the Warriners, a semi-
retired couple who killed themselves in a suicide pact after losing their 
retirement savings .47 
With the spread of legalized gambling in the 19905, thc teen suicides 
related to gambling became alarming. One well-known case involved a 
19-year-old student, Jason Berg, who became hooked, lost his school money, 
and killed himself.48 The impact of gambling-related suicides on families was 
reflected two and a half years later when his grief-stricken stepfather 
committed suicide.49 Highlighting the tragic impact of gambling losses on 
families was a 2001 instance where a Michigan father lost heavily in 
Las Vegas, and when he returned home, he killed his pregnant wife, his three 
children, and himself.so 
These cases demonstrate that by 2001legaiized gambl ing had created a 
"national health problem.,,51 As might be expected, the worst suicide rates 
were in Nevada. "Nevada has had the highest suicide rate for more than ten 
43. Mike Mar1indale. Motor Cit)" Dell/as Saw Trouble Comillg. DF.TROITN"w.~. Jan. 28. 2000. at 
CI. Officer Kill! HilllJel/in Cllrillo Aftu Losillg Thousallds. ST. LoUIS POsT·DISI'A"rCH, Jan. 28. 2000, at 
M . 
44. Le~l Counsel, Cily of Joliet, 01 .. Teslimony to 1he Na1ional Gambling Impact Study Comm'n 
(May 20, 1998). 
45. Stephen Bralln.l..ivts Lost ill a Rh'(T 0/ Debt. L.A. TIMES, Jllne 22. 1991, at AI. 
46. Id. 
47. ld. 
48. Casino Watch-GlImbling Addiction Suicides, amilllhit at www.casino .... alch.oriVsuicidesl 
5uicidcs.ntml: Stt also Lany Fruhling. Addic/iall Uatb /0 Tragic End, DES MOIN ES ROO .. Mar. 25. 1991, 
at M1. 
49. Su John Warren Kmdt../nlemalionally, 2001 Is No r~/ortilt Uni/td Statts /0 8t Gombl"'g 
wilh rilt Economy." 17It 8usintu Eco"omic /mpllC/S of Gomhlillg Activilltl ConJuC/t " AnY"'ilere, 
ol'ai/abl( at http://wwwnealgorglJohn'iPOlGndfs%20Nashville%20DoculllCIllpdf 
-
SO. Melli Ktl/s Family, SdfOve.rGambling ~bu, CHARLESTO!'<GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 2000, at A3. 
,I. Rachel M~r, S"ici<k At/ad: StTlltegy Unytiled. LAs VECAS REV.J., May 3, 200 1, al A1. 
--
~ 
~ 
-
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years. In 1999. more than 429 residents took their own li ves, according to 
stale figures that don't include visitors,"S2 These disturbing (fends prompted 
U.S. Surgeon General David Satcher in 2001 to unveil a national U.S. su icide 
prevention plan, and he highlighted gambling addiction as a national health 
issue. S.l Surgeon General Satcher's concerns were shared by former U.S. 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph A. CalifanoS4 and by 
former Commissioner to the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission Richard C . 
Leone.s, The targeting of the elderly by the gambling industry was a 
panicular national health concern.56 The gambling industry derogatorily 
referred to this target market as the "golden grays" due to their gray hair and 
their golden retirement assets.~7 Of course, once those retirement assets were 
lost there was little opportunity or time for the elderly to recoup, leading to 
more possibiliLies for despair and perhaps suicide, as in the case of the 
Warriners' apparent suicide pact. 58 Another concern was the target marketing 
to children via children's themes on video gambling machines leading to 
charges that the gambling industry had transfonned the problem of Joe Camel 
into "Joe Casino. "~9 
Even the conservative and only partial listing of social costs reported in 
the 2001 Century Foundation Report ranged between $5 billion to $40 billion 
for pathological (addicted) gamblers and problem gamblers on a lifetime 
basis.60 Exgerts clustered the cost estimates per year at $24 billion to 
$88 billion, I with $40 billion being the mid_range62 and the $40 billion 
estimate independently corroborated by the American Medical Association.63 
Theeconomic impact of video gambling machines, in particular. was also 
dramatic. A leading study from Australia in 2(X)() concluded that for every 
eighty video gambling machines 52 million was drained from and "damaged 
S2. Id. 
S3. !d. 
54. Joseph A. Califano. Chairman & Pres.> Nat'! Or. 011 Addiction & Substance Abuse. Stalement 
at the CASA Conference at Columbia Universily (June 12.200 1). 
55. RichllJd C. Leone. President. Cenrnry Foulldation. Statemenl al the CASA Conference at 
Columbia UnivCflity (June 12. 2001). 
56. Su, t.g .. Erika Gosker. N(){e, Tht MarkelingofGnmbling IOlht Elllt'rfy. 7 EI...OCRLJ. 185. 186 
(1999). 
57. Su gtntrolly Id. 
SR. Su id. at 185. 
59. Su, e.,., Patrick Jenkins. HOI olllhe Trai/, Crilies Riled Up Ch'u New Siof M(I(:hmt$ ThaI 
~aJ To Kids, STAA·UOCER. Mar. l. 2000. (fi'ailcJJle at 2000 WL 15866899. 
60. Su RACHElA. VOl..8£11.G. WtlE." THE CHIPS ARE DoWN 17 (2001). 
61. Mega·LawsUItS, supra note 34. al 44, tbL A3: 53·54 (table !howing ranges of upen opinion) . 
62. Itt 
63. A).I . MI'.o. Assoc., HOUSE OF DruGATES RESOWIlON 430 (A-94) ( 1994). 
2003) ECONOMIC STIMUWS ACT 371 
the local economy" each year.64 Furthennore, for every three video gambling 
machines, two jobs were lost.6~ 
B. Gamblin.g Benefits OnLy the Owners and Nor the HOST Communities 
The 1999 U.S. Gambling Conunission largely reconfinned that licensed 
gambling benefits only the owners of the gambling at the expense of me host 
communities and regional economies.fIlI A headline in the Omaha World-
Heraldhighlighted that economists affmned that the costs far outweighed the 
benefits by stating "40 Economists Side Against More Gambling" with the 
subtitle "Signers: Costs Likely Higher Than Benefits.'>67 The Wall Street 
Journal summarized that in Louisiana "the industry has been embroiled in 
virtual nonstop scandal ... and its much-touted economic payoff, especially 
in terms of job creation, has fallen far short of promises.'>68 
Throughout the 1990s, many states considered allowing casino-style 
gambling and rejected it because of the socioeconomic negatives associated 
with video gambling machines. These machines constituted not only 
eighty percent of casino revenues, but also constituted the "crack cocaine" of 
gambling addiction.M When state policymakers and the electorate were given 
the time and the opportunity to examine the costs and benefits of video 
gambling machines, these types of gambling activities appeared to be 
disfavored by the public.10 While the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission 
unanimously called for prohibitions on "convenience" video gambling 
machines71 and a moratorium on any proliferation of licensed gambling 
activities,72 the public of the 21st century was s(ill being misled by industry-
generated reports and promotional pieces.?] With the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
64. Roy<:e Millar, Cl)Ijllci/s Eytl Odd.! 011 Pokitl DamDltI. ACIOCO. LTD .. (kt 22. 2000. 
65. !d. 
66. SU gtlnulllly NOISe FINAL REfOIlT. mpro note 24; NOISe ExECUTTVE SUMMARY. !Upro note 
25. 
67. Robert Don, 40 EC(mom/jtsS;d~ Ago;'!sl More Gambling: SiS"UJ: Com Likely H;gher Than 
Benefiu, OM AHA WOIl.U)..li£ll.AW, Sept. 22. 1996, II BI. 
6l!. Rick Wartzman. Bayou Back/osll,' Gamblins js Pro~in8 10 Be a POQr Wager far Stolt of 
wu;siaM: BUS;ntIJ I! Disappoiming and an FBJ Groft ProM Rolls 0 Jarhd E/t!Ctor(lIe, WALL ST. J .. 
Sepl. ] 1, 1995,.t AI. 
69. Su NGISC ANAl. REPORT, SIlpru note 24. al 5·5. 7·21 
70. Su gen~rall)' id. ; suo ~.g .. Ben C. Toledano. Gwrtbling KCa~lbagg~rs~ Mau MUJlSsipp' 
a LawI1,oOtiler Statu. O).tAIiA WORLD-HERALD. Apr. ]), ]997, al B 13(abbrr:viatcdreprint from Apr, 7 
anick in NAT'lREv.): su 1Ilpro nOles 2·), 4. 7 and accompanyinglext 
71. Suo ~.J/ .. NOISe ExECUTTVESUMMARY. JIlpra!l(l(e 25. ret. 3-6. 
72. Su, ~.J/ .• rd. al introduction by Chair Kay C. James; NGISe ANAl. REPORT. supro rtOte 24. QI 
introduction by Oulir Kay C. James. 
73. For groundbreaking articles detailing the political donations and. lobbying of the gamhling 
industry. seeManin Koughan, E"s), Money, MOTHER JONES. July·Aug. 1997, at 32: April LYllCb, AII8eu 
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Conunission's repol1 and the many academic reports indicating that the net 
effect') of legalized gambling activities were detrimental to the social and 
economic foundations of the United States. government officials supporting 
new gambling initiatives could not have been ignorant of these reports and 
were vulnerab le to charges of corrupt decisionmaking.74 
The previous national commission that analyzed gambling activities was 
in 1975-1976.7~ By the 19905, the need for the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission was highlighted by new video technologies that the industry was 
promoting to provide gambling video tenninals in each U.S. living room, at 
each work station, and in every classroom-particu larly via the Internet. 
Various forms of ~ambling were also initiated or proposed for U.S. airlines 
(virtual airplanes), 6 railroad cars (casinos), blimps, and dozens of casino ships 
(conducting gambling "trips to nowhere" and including a proposal to lease a 
Soviet aircraft carrier77 for Florida's casino gamblers). Once riverboat 
casinos, in particular, were legalized by state legislatures, even greater 
political pressures developed to authorize numerous, unanticipated varieties 
of gambling. When riverboats no longer had to cruise, the "speed" of the 
gambling increased by 25 to 50 percent which meant increased revenues for 
the owners of25 to 50 percent, 18 but these revenues ,rarall eled increased social 
costs three times greater than the new revenues. Increasingly, states and 
communities were be ing forced to choose if they wished to be based on a 
gambling economy (like Nevada and Atlantic City) or a non·gambling 
economy (like Hawaii, Utah, and Tennessee). 
An Of/. MOTHER JONES. July-Aug. 1997. at 38; su alse John W. Kindt, Follow Ihe Mcm:y; Q,mbling. 
Elhics, ami S"/;II<H"'u~. 556 ANNALS AM . ACAD. F\)L & S(x:. SCI. 85 (1998) [hereinafter Felluw Ihe 
MeneyJ. 
74. See gel!<'mllyCEO REPORT. i"pra note 22: see also Follew the Money, SUpTII nOle 73; Strategic 
ECCI,omit; Bau. s"pm nOle 41. Gumbling 1n(luury Perpetual Ne"·Compiia,,ce, supr(. note 39. 
7S. U.S. COMM'N ON TIm REVIEW OF A NAT'L PoLICY TOWARD GAMKIJNG, GAMSU ... O IN 
AMERICA (1976) (hcreinaflcr U.S. COMM'N G"'""IBUNGJ. 
76. Ste, e.g., Daniel S, Greenberg. GambluJ. Fa$un Your Money Belts. on Flight 7 _ COIne _ ", 
WASH. Prn.'T, Mar. 2. 1991. at C1. ovoilable <lI 1997 WL 9337461 . 
n. Press Release, Miami Jockey Club. Jockey Club, Inc, Subsidiary Announces Plan 10 Convert. 
Operate R\Ilisian Aircnft Camer As Floating Casino (Sept. I, 1995) (on Iile wilh luthor). 
18. Su, e,g .. Kevin McDcnnott, Illinois Casinos' Palr{)ll(1gt SlI'I!li1 in Fim Mom" 01 Ope" 
Boordi"g, ST. LouiS PUST- D ISPATCH. Aug. 12, 1999. at AI. 
79. Suo e.,., John W. Kindt, ~8IUiMu,£ClJlWmlclmJXICr~0IUC<'nudC01ineCornbli"g i" WUl 
Vi'linia ; Slrort-Ttrtfl Gain bUI Lcng.Term Pain . 13 W. VA. 'u. PuB. AFF. REP. 22. 23 (1996), 
Irllp·/Iwww.polM:l.lWU.tdulipa/plJrlnpo"_IJ_2.mm. [hereinafter BU1111t1s,£conomic Impaas 01 
Gm'llbl'''g ]. 
2003J ECONOMIC STIMULUS ACT 373 
III. CLARIFICA nON OF GOALS 
A. The Economic Development Argumem Exposed 
From a business-economic perspective, the main issue involved in 
legalizing various fonus of gambling was whether gambling activities 
constituted a valid strategy for economic development. While the dollars 
invested in various legal ized gambling projects and the jobs initially created 
were evident, the industry was strongly criticized for inflating the positive 
economic impacts and lrivializing, ignoring, and even hiding the negative 
impacts.so T he industry's tendency to focus on specialized factors provide a 
distorted view of the localized economic positives, while ignoring the strategic 
business-economic costs to the Slate as a whole and to different regions of the 
United States.sl In 1994, all of the various expens who testified before the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Small Business criticized the 
impacts that casino-style gambling activities inflicted upon the criminal justice 
system, the social welfare system. small businesses, and the economy.82 
Utilizing legalized gambling activities as a strategy for economic development 
was thoroughly discredited during the hearing. 
Until the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission, Florida was the only state 
which had conducted a comprehensive statewide analysis of the impacts of 
legalized gambling activities.83 Its report concurred with the congressional 
hearing's negative conclusions about legalized gambling activities.~ 
Since some issue areas have not received widespread public attention, 
this analysis highlights some of (he neglected issue areas as they relale to tax 
revenues, social-welfare costs, education, and job creation. 
8. Gambling Makes U.S. a Nation of Losers 
Between 1991 and 1996. gambling proponents spent over $105 million 
to obfuscate the issues involved in gambling. Therefore, delimiting some 
basic principles of analyzing gambling is frequently useful to me public.Jj To 
80. CEO REPORT. supra note 22. a1 summary. 
81. Su. t.g .• CAL. GoVIlRNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING & R~~I!ARCH. CAUPORNIA AND NEVADA: 
SU8SIDY. MONOI'OI.Y. AND CQMPIITlTlVE EFfECTS OF I.J:r.AlJ ....... "O GA).4HU"G ES-I (1992) (heremaftcr 
SU8SIDY, MONOPOLY. GAM8USC]; Strategic Uanotl1lC Ba,~. supra n(l(e 41. 
82. Su S~f!~rall)' Tht NallolWllmpacf of Cluj"a Gambling Proliftroriof! in tht Uf!il~d S/(Ilts: 
H~aring &fo,~ Iht Houst CQmmu.:I"IOII Of! Smnll Bu,;,.tsS, I03rd Congo (1994) (SlIllelTlCnt of Jeffry L 
8JoombeTg. State's "'"ome),. Laurence Coonly. S.D.). 
83. FLA.GoVS!.NOA;·SOfRcE.CASINOSlNA..oIcIOA: ANANALYSI:iOF1'HEEcoNo~ICANDSOCIAL 
IMPACTS (1994) [hereinafter A ..... Gov. RI'.J'ORTJ. 
84. 111. 
85. Follow /hl' Mont)'. supra 110le 73. at 8S: Lynch. supra nQle 73. nl 38 (over $ 100 million from 
199210 1997). For ao eumpleof a specific state's problems involvmK gambling proponenlS and polillcal 
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begin any study, the most relevant number was the amounllo~' r by gamblers 
per year in the relevant market (approximately $61.4 billion lost by the U.S. 
public in 2000),116 Of these amounts lost. approximately 30 percent (primarily 
from lotteries) resulted in lax revenues to local and state governments 
(approx imately SI8 billion in taxes in 2000).87 
In gambling industry srudies. the underlying focus was usually on: 
1. how fast money could be extracted from the public , and 
2. how efficiently money could be extracted from the public. lUi 
The techniques utilized to accomplish these goals usually were: 
I. new, more, and faster gambling technology, and 
2. new and more sophisticated marketing. ~~ 
The speed (and not the type) of the gambling constituted the proper focus. "In 
a focused costlbenefit analysis, socio-economic costs, tax revenues, and other 
considerations should be calculated as afunction of the degree of gambling 
(i.e. , 'amounts lost' or 'gross revenues, ).'>9(1 
C. The 1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis 
The 1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis omitted the most important 
numbers. The reported numbers of palhoJogical gamblers and problem 
gamblers for the 120 to 152 studies analyzed were missing numbers which 
made it impossible for independent corroboration." The authors of the 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis should complete Appendix II by including 
the "reported" numbers of pathological gamblers and problem gamblers for 
all 120 to 152 studies.'2 
OOf1uibu! ions. see KENT D. REDFlEllI. Sn.CKING THE DECK: ThE Plow 01' M OoNEY FROM G AM8LINC 
L''1'ERFST'S INTO IU.JNQIS PoLITICS (1999). 
&6. ' ''T'LGAM!SG ANOWACERING Bus .• I. 32 (Aug. 2(01). 
87. ~~ g~llually id. 
88. U.S. and Internal ion.! Costs, supra DOle 23. ~t gtll ('rolly GambllllR Sub!idiud. !"'pro IlOIC I. 
89. ~~ U.S. and lntemalional Costs. s"'pra note 23; JU also John W. Kindt. ugali~~d Ga",h/illS 
Activillu: 1M luun /Ilvo/vjllg Marktt Sa,urol.C1ft. 15 N.ILL. U. L. REV. 271 (1995). 
90. &t U.S. Ind International COSIS. ~upro note 23. al 5 (emphasis added). 
91. &t IIARVARO ADOICIlONS META-ANALYSLS. supra DOte 3), App. Il 
92. Id. 
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IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Addictions 
In 1997, it was reported that 1.5 million people or .5 percent of the U.S. 
population became new pathological gamblers in three years from 1994 to 
199113 at a cost of $45 billion per year.94 In 1995, Associate Professor 
Howard J. Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported, 
"[g ]ambUng is an addictive behavior. make no mistake about it .... Gambling 
has all the properties of a psychoactive substance. and again, the reason is that 
it changes the neurochemistry of the brain." 9' Symptomatic of the 
individualized problems of gambling addiction was one 1998 Chicago, Illinois 
case where a mother addicted to gambling allegedly killed her two children in 
separate instances and tried to collect $200,000 in insurance money so she 
could continue 10 gamble.WI This scenario led to her conviction and 
subsequent incarceration. 
In 1997, it became public that the Colorado lottery was utilizing a 
"Mindsort" model. which allegedly was designed to appeallo pathological and 
problem gamblers indicating that consistent gamb lers were "[lJower on trial, 
but once hooked, hooked.'''fi A 1997 in-depth survey by the Chicago SIUl-
Times reported that poor people were viewing the instant games of the lottery 
as a source of income98 and in another 1997 survey it was reported that 50.5 
percent of the people gambling were trying "to win money," instead of 
gambling for entertainment (33 .4 percent).99 
Recognizing that 27 percent to 55 percent of casino revenues were 
coming from pathological gamblers and problem gamblers, HlO concerns were 
raised about appeals to this market segment. 
93. !d . • t43, tbl. 13; 51, tbl . 16. 
94. Meg,,-ww3Uil$, swpro note 34. at 44. tbls. A I & A3; 52-54. 
95. Ford Turner. Nt'ur(J("he'71kals Bwmt!d/or Compul!iI'e GamblinlJ, 8 COMPULSIVE GAM8L1NG 
(1995- 19961. at I (eiting UNION-Np.ws (Springfield, Mus. ) (May 10, 1995». 
96. Cam Simpson, 8C1hy /)(C1th P10l ToM; Suburb MClm Indicted in lmurunu Scheme. au. SUN-
TlMFS. Mar. 7, 1998, al J. 
97. Su, e.!! .• U.S. and International Costs. swpro note 23; see JOafl llt Conte. Addreq .III the 
Marketing and Public Policy Conference of IDe Anler"k.n Marketing ASSQCialion (June 5-6, 1998) 
(discussi llg IheCoiotado lottery' s Mlndsort madeting and other ad\·ertising ooncems involving gambling). 
98. 11m Novak &: Jon ~hm.id, Lot/ery Pidu Splil by RClCI'. l7Ic~; Games Popularity ~ptndJ 
on Wh('1l! You live. Otl. SUI'-Tl!>lES, June 22. 1997, at 1,24-25. 
99. Set Why People Gamble. 3 THE WAGER. Mar. 17. 1998,a'C1i/C1b1"al http:/;,.,ww,thewager.orgf 
B.d.:indexlvo13pdftw311.pdr. 
100. Su .... g .. Henry R.l..c5ieur. lJ<lmbling: Socioeummnic Impacts wuI Public Policy: Com and 
T"C1fmt'ntQ/ PClrho/QlJiwl Gumblmg. 556 ANNAL~ AM. ACAI). PoL. & Soc. SCI. 153. 165 Ibl. 1 ( 1998); 
Prof. Henry R.l.eliieur. Addre:ls 9t the National Conference on Gambling Behavior (Sept. 3-S. 1996 ). 
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By purchasing lists from credit-card companies, the casinos know 
what you buy. and then they can track census data to approximate 
your home value and income. Then there are the direct-mail lists. 
One such list from the early 1990s was baldly called the "Compulsive 
Gamblers Special" and promised to deli ver 200,000 names of people 
with "unquenchable appetites for all fonns of gambling." Another list 
features "some 250,000 hard-core gamblers." Yet another purveys 
the names of 80,000 people who responded to a vacation 
sweepstakes-telemarketing pitch. WI 
In addition to the L5 million new pathological (addicted) gamblers. 
3.5 mi llion people or 2 percent of the U.S. population became new "problem" 
gamblcnl in the three years from 1994 to 1997 at a cost of $17.5 billion per 
year. 102 From $24 billion to $88 billion was the range of costs to the taxpayers 
of the 1.5 million new pathological gamblers and 3.5 million new problem 
gamblers addicted from 1994 to 1997 1U~ as a result of govemment~sponsored 
gambling. By some estimates, these costs and related public health costs were 
even higher than the costs of drug addiction to society. 104 
B. Bankruptcies 
The bankruptcy costs of 1.5 million new pathological gamblers in the 
three years from 1994 to 1997 were at least $9 billion with 315,000 
bankruptcy fili ngs. lOS The annual U.S. bankruptcy costs due to legalized 
gambling were at least $3 billion with 105.000 new bankruptcy filings. 1011 
These numbers were projected to increase by 50 percent as the 1990s ended 
and as more of the new pathological gamblers finally "bouomed OU1.,,107 In 
1997, the costs of bankruptcies (including gambling bankruptcies) to each 
U.S. household were a lready at $408 per year and increasing. 1011 
101. S. C. Gwynne. How Casinos Hook You; The Gambling Indll5try IJ Cnating High.rtch 
Dawbliuslo Rttl in CQmpulsl~t Playtrs. TIME. Noy. 11. 1997, at 68, 159. 
102. Mtga-Lawsuill. supra nOle 34. al44, Ibl. A2 (ciling HARV ... RD ADDICTIONS MET ... • ... N ... L 'ISIS, 
supru noce 33); ue also Harvard DiVIsion on Addictions Press Relcase, supra note 33. 
103. Ml'ga·LawJu;'s. supra nOle 34. at 44. Ibis . Al -A3: 52-54. 
104. CQmp<lft itl. al44, Ibis. Al & A2. with id. a144. tbl. A3. 
105. Mt B ... NKRUPTCY CRlStS, ~upra nOle 17, al 12)·24; U~ also Mega -wwsui'J, sUllm nOle 34, 
at 45; Ibl A.4: 54-55. n. Ibl. A4 1-9 . Much higher cost can be extrapolated from WEFA Group. "The 
Financial CostJ of Personal Bankruptcy. at I, 15. 19 (Feb. 1998). 
106. U.S. and International Costs, sUfHa nOIe 21, at 8. 
107. td. 
lOS. Preu Release, NJ. Coundl on Compulsivc Gambling. Ncw NaIKln.1 Stud)· Shows C~laDon 
8C1\\'CC!I Gambling Gro ... th lDd the: SignificlIlt Rise in Personal Banknlptcies (Spring 1997), a}·ailablt a, 
http://www.800gambler.org/bankrupc.htm. 
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The bankruptcy costs of 3.5 million new "problem" gamblers in the 
three years from 1994 to 1997 were at least $3 billion per year with 90,000 
bankruptcy filings. H1+ The annual U.S. bankruptcy costs due to problem 
gamblers were at least $1 billion with 30,000 new bankruptcy filings per 
year,I 10 "Clinical observations of trends indicated that the percentages of 
bankruptcies due to legalized gambling would tend to increase to 15 percent 
or more as lhe year 2000 approached.,, 111 In 2001 . the New Bankruptcy 
l:.pidemic reported that al least 5 percent of bankruptcies were due to 
gambling. 112 which was conservative compared to other expert estimates of 10 
La 15 percent. In 
C. Crime 
The crime costs of 1.5 million new pathological gamblers, which 
governments created from 1994 to 1997, would be S34.2 billion pursuant to 
the 1994 report by the Florida Governor's Office of Planning and Budget 
Analysis tilled Casinos if! Florida: An Analysis of the Economic and Social 
Impacts. 114 In 2003, this report is still considered the most relevant 
authoritative report for this type of strategic/regional calculation. 115 Applying 
the methodology of this analysis to the reported increases from J 994 to 1997 
in pathological and problem gamblers yields new soc ioeconomic costs to the 
taxpayers of S34.2 billion for these years. 116 
Directly because of state governments legali~ing gambling, 1.5 million 
people or .5 percent of the U.S. population became new criminals in the 
three years from 1994 to 1997 at a U.S. cost ofSI2 billion to S15 billion. 1l 7 
Virtually all pathological gamblers commit crimes, but most are not pro-
secuted because the crimes are against family members or close associates. 118 
Experts and studies report that between 12.5 percent and 15 percent of patho-
109. See BA:-':KRUI'TCYCR1S1S, $upfllll(){e 37, al 122·24; su abo Mega-Law£uiu, supra note 34. at 
45. tbl. A5: 55, n. tbL AS 1- 10. 
110. U,S. Bnd Internalional COlIS. supra note 23, al S. 
III. /d. at 8-9. 
112. B A..", KRUPTCY EPI[)F.M IC • .lupru!lQ(e 38. at 212. 
113. Panel Discussion of Crledil EJ[peru. MidwUl Conf oftht Nat 'l Coatitioll AgaillSt ugali<.t'11 
Gamblmg. Des Moines, Iowa (May 1-2. 1995) (increased liliags due to gambling In:nding toward 
IS percent of lOla 1 filings). 
114. FU.. Gov. REPUMT, supra nOle 113. 
I! S. ld. 
11 6. Su, I!.g .. id. al 72. 
117. Mega·La .... suits, supro nOIC 34. al 46 tbl. A7: 56 n. lbl. A7 1-6; sU H ARVA RD ADOICTlONS 
M~"'A-ANALYSIS, $Upro nOle 33. 3143. lbl. 13; 51. Ibl. 16. 
118. Su gmerol/y GA~tIlLING ADDICTION L'I MARYLAND. s"fm' note 34, IL---_ --' 
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logical gamblers will become incarcerated,I 19 It should also be noted that 
pathological gamblers lend 10 commit multiple property-acquisition crimes. 1211 
Political scientists note that governments should not encourage or promote 
criminal behavior or crimes, which is what governments do when they 
legalize, advertise. and promote gambling. Furthennore, sociologists note thal 
U.S. state governments are not in the business of selling alcohol or tobacco 
products, but U.S. state governments sell gambling packaged as patriolism. 12 1 
The panial (incarceration) costs of the 1.5 million new pathological 
gamblers, which slate governments created from 1994 to J 997, were at least 
$2 billion, '22 The average regulatory and corrections costs per year calculated 
as a function of the total number of pathological gamblers were between 
$9,000 and $ 11 .000 per pathological gambler per year. 12.1 
V. TRENDS AND CONDITIONlNG FAcroRS 
A. The Strategic SOcioEconomic Costs of Parhological Gambling and 
Problem Gambling: Overview of Calculations 
The three steps to calculating the strategic socioeconomic costs of 
pathological gambling and problem gambling are as follows: 
1. Step One: Calculate the relevant popUlation base, which usually 
corresponds to the population in the "feeder markets" (thiny-five 
mile radius or one hundred-mile radius around the gambling 
cente r) in the specialized studies of the gambling industry. For 
conve nience, the current population of the United States (or 
other country), any state, county, or city can be easily obtained 
from the latest edition of The World Almanac. Similar 
calculations have been used and verified in the tobacco cases 
and associated academic literarure. ' 'l4 Current Bureau of the 
Census data can also be obtained online. m 
119. M~lJa-Law$uil$. $j,pro note 34. al47 tbl. A8; 56-57 n. tol. AS 1-10. 
120. Su 8t'11t'",l/y GAMBUl'G ADDICTION IN MARYLAND. supra note 34. 
12 1. Su, t.g .. Senator Paul Simon. America Fight-Back. Addres. a tlhc Annual Couf. of the Nat'! 
Coalition Again~1 ~gali~ Gambling. (Sept. IS-20. I99S), ul hllp:l/www.llcalg.orglconf'J8-kcynQtc.hLml. 
122. Meg(.-uIW$U,/s. supru nole 34, al47 tbl. AS; 56-57 n. Ibl. AS ! -IO;su g~n~ra/fy O ...... 1BLIN(; 
ADOICTION I'i" MAIIVLO.ND, supra note 34, 31 2. 59-61. 
123. M'K(I-J..u .... J .. iu_ supra DOle 34. al47 Ihl. A9; 57-59 n. tbl. A9 1-12. 
124. Comport. J. S. Vernik & S. P. Tc:m, A Public Heallh Approach 10 R~8ul(l/in& Fireumu liS 
COII$UlIKr Products, 148 U. Pt,.NN. L REV. 1193 (2000) (utiliz.ing currenl edilions of Th~ Worl</AlnIlmllc 
forpopu!1l.1too statistics) "'ilh John W. Kindt, The &xmomic Impocts ofugaliud Gambling Activiti~s, 4J 
DRAKE L Rtv. 51, 90-95 Ih l. 3 (1994) (~o!llIJKnding current editions of The World AIIOO.rtJC for 
populBuon $IDtislics) [herein.aficr fronomic lmp<lclsJ. 
125. PQpulalJon DIvision, U.S. Census Bureau. PopulalJoo EsllllllUes Program (Jan. :t 2001). 01 
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2. Step Two: Calculate the relevant percentages of the population 
that are pathological gamblers and problem gamblers. Unless a 
specified study gives authoritative percentages for a specific 
population base, the general population percentages can be 
applied. Since inexplicably, the Harvard Addictions Meta-
analysis did not report the most important numbers-that is. the 
percentages of pathological and problem gamblers reponed in 
the 120-\52 st udies reviewed'Yl-the general population 
percentages must be utilized. These percentages are: 
1994123 
379 
Pathological Gamblers .77% .84% (.5% Increase) 1.29% 
Problem Gamblers 2.33% 2.93% (2% Increase) 4.88% 
These percentages are the starting points for general calculations. 
3. Step Three: Multiply the population base times the projected 
increases in pathological gamblers (conservatively .5 percent) 
times the socioeconomic costs or one pathological gambler 
(conservatively $10,(00). According to experts, each 
pathological gambler creates overall strategic socioeconomic 
costs of between $10,000 (partial listing of costs) and $80,000 
per year. While a conservative range of $30,000 to $50.000 per 
year is quile reasonable. the $10,000 per year is recommended 
by experts as the amount . which is beyond any reasonable 
challenge. D O 
Repeat this process by multiplying the population base times 
the projected increases in problem gamblers (conservatively 
2 percent) times the socioeconomic costs of one problem 
gambler (conservatively $2.000). Adding these totals together 
gives a very conservative total cost of the new pathological and 
hnp:llwy,:w.ceMu5.gov/populltionlestimateslnationfinfite2-I.UI. 
126. Set! HARVAIU> AOOlCTtONS META-A.'<AL YSIS. II/pro note 33. App. n. at 106. 
127. U.S. Co~I\t"N GAMBLING. supra lI()Ie 7:.1. at n . 
i2S. Set! HARVAIU) AOOICTIONS META-ANAL 'ISIS, supra lime 33, al 43. Ibl. 13; 51. tbl. 16. 
129. Id. 
130. Su Mtg(J-LAw$U;I:.·. SllPfli note 34, al44. tbl. A3: 53·54 n. tbl. AJ J·9. 
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problem gamblers to the taxpaye rs occasioned by allowing new 
legalized gambling activities. 
B. Economic Cycles and Gambling 's Impact on Tax Revenues 
From the perspective of U.S. economic history, the United States has had 
previous economic cycles wilh widespread legalized gambling activities. 13 1 
The most relevant cycle occurred after the American Civil War and paralle led 
the post-bellum migration to the "Wild West."m Although gambling 
prol iferated during th is timeframe. within a few years the trend towards 
prohibiting gambling activities had begun, and by 1910, there was virtually no 
legal gambling in the United Slates,lB Gambling activ ities were not just 
prohibited via state statutes and local ordinances, but more importantly, these 
prohibitions were incorporated into most state constitutions. l.~ The fact that 
state constitutional provisions were utilized to make it as difficult as possible 
for future generations to legalize gambling activities (and thereby experiment 
once again with a classic "boom and bust" economic cycle) lends substantial 
credence to arguments that both historically and currently. the legalization of 
gambling activities eventually causes: (1 ) increased taxes, (2) a loss of jobs 
from the overall region, (3) economic disruption of other businesses, 
(4) increased crime. and (5) large social-welfare costs for society in general 
and government agencies in particular. m For example. two studies of the 
riverboat casinos in llIinois concluded that for every one job created by the 
riverboats, most of the surrou nding communities probably lost onc or more 
jobs from pre-existing businesses. 136 
In recent economic history, the taxfayers have directly and indirectly 
subsidized legalized gambling activities. I 7 The field research throughout the 
nation indicates thaI for every dollar the legalized gambling interests indicate 
is being contributed in taxes, it usually costs the taxpayers at least 
3 dollars-and higher numbers have been calculated. I.18 These costs to 
131 . Busine)'J·£Cunl)mrc Impuc/s ufGmnhlin g .. '''pm nOle 79. 
132. 1<1. 
133. 1<1. 
134 . M. 
135. Itl. 
136. R~5illt$!'&QlIf)",ic Impacts ofCambling, fupra nOll: 79; fee Earl L Grino!s & J. O. Omorov, 
Who Loses When CasinO$ Win? 53 11..1_ Bus. REV. 7, 7 (1996); Stt Earl L. Grinobl . Blulf Or Winning 
lIalld? Ril'ulxJ,at Gnmbling and RegiO/wl EmploYllumt artd Un employment. 51 lU.. BUS. REV. 8. 8 (l 994). 
137. Set g~lluQIl)' Gambling Subsidiud. supro noll: I : Jtt S UBSIDY. MONOPOLY. GAM BUNG. supra 
noIe 8 1. 
138. Forcxamplc, JUSt the social-welfare eoslS mentioned at footnotes 93·123 supra Il su.Uy dwarf 
the projected new \.IIX n:vcnl.lCs from the legalized gambling a.ctivilles. Suo t.,. , Fu.. 0010' . R EPORT, s"pra 
noIe 83; I:I I:TnR Gov·T Ass·N.STAFF WIl ITE P .... PER: CASISO G .... MBllNC INOIIC .... CO (1992J; Roben M. 
. 
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laxpayers are reflected in: (l) infrastructure costs, (2) relatively high 
regulatory costs. (3) expenses to the criminal justice system, and (4) large 
social welfare costS. 119 Accordingly, several stale legislators (e.g., in South 
Dakota) have called for arleasl partially internalizing these external costs by 
tax ing all legalized gambling activities at a straight 50 percent tax raLc. l 4!1 
Furthennore. as a matter of good public policy, state officials and 
legislators in some states. lllinois for example (particularly Representative 
Rick Winkel), have proposed legislation to prohibit contributions by legalized 
gambling interests to politicians and political campaigns. In 2001, this bill 
passed the lIlinois House by an 82-21 margin but was killed by gambling 
proponents in the Senate. 141 In the case of casinos. New Jersey already has 
such prohibitions, but other states have neglected to cnaci si milar 
prohibitions. '42 
Political scientists have raised concerns that the developing 
constituencies in the licensed gambling industry arc becoming so widespread 
that the industry can dictate economic, social, and tax policies. 14) For 
example, the industry drafted a state constitutional referendum in Florida, 
which would have mandated the introduction of casinos into communities-
even if a particular community voted unanimously against a casino. I " The 
industry spent approximately $3 million to get the Ronda referendum on the 
ballot and $16.5 million to campaign for the casinos-more than the combined 
gubernatorial campaigns of Governor Lawton Chiles and his challenger Jeb 
Bush, being conducted during the same election cycle. l •u A 1998 referendum 
in California to allow video gambling machines (the crack cocaine of 
gambling addicts) on American lndian reservations was financed by 
S 100 million to $120 million from gambling industry contributors. l46 These 
Poillz.e:r el Bl .. Rt'pon 011 f~ COSf·Bt'nt'jiIiEjft'Clivt'nt'St of Tre(lfmt'nt (II flit' Johns Hopkins Center for 
Paill%,u:ol Gamblmg. 1 J. GAMBLINC BEHAV, 131 (1985), 
t 39. St'e. t., .. Press Release. Off.lll. Gov. Jame$ Edgar. GoVCTllOl' Warns Land-Based CasinOS Could 
Bnng Crime SUfge a.s Well as Overall Loss of Jobs and Slale Revenues (Sept 29. 1992) (wmmariring 
several nhnois stole repons). 
140. Su gl'lItTtllly Q,,,,bUIIS Subsidizt!d, supra note L 
141 Su , es .• Editorial. Picl:i"8 on Casinos (md Racelracb. NEW .. ..()AZ.ET'J'F. (Champaign. m.J. 
Mar. 21. 2001, at A6. 
142. Set! sentraUy Follow I~ MOMY. supra lKMe 73; Koollhan. Jupra note 73. at 32; Lynch. Jupra 
no(e 73. I t 38. 
143. Su, t.K,. CEDREPORT.lupro IIOle 22. 
144. Mutin Dyckman, Editorial. Milltadin, lhe Public. ST. PIl'nRS8URG TNES. Nov, I. 1994. at 
All. 
145. Louis uvelle. VOI,n Dtal Loss 10 Casinos: GGmbling BClckert l.ost Dtspile $/6.5 MililOIl 
CllmpCIi,n. TA.\li'A TlU8., No\·. 9.1994. at 1. 5. 
146. Stt, t.K .. T<XId S. PurdUIl. COSIly FiShl Ra,tJ in Cali/ornUl aver Indian Gambling MeClsun. 
N.Y. l htES. Occ. 13. 1998. at AI. 
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amounts in one state referendum were comparable to the combined total spent 
by presidential candidates William Clinton and Robert Dole in the 1996 
election, I.' In these contexts, an article in the Columbia Journalism Review 
cautions the news media to "flat out ask [experts, academics. and even other 
reporters] if they make money off the industry.,,14S To define the issues, the 
public should "follow the money.,, 149 
C. Social Welfare Costs 
Legalized gambling acti vities act as a regressive tax on the poor. ISO 
Specifically, the legalization of various fonns of gambling activities makes 
"poor people poorer" and can dramatically intensify many preexisting social-
welfare problems. Demographic analyses reveal that certain disadvantaged 
socioeconomic groups tend to gamble proportionately greater amounts of their 
overall income. Marketing efforts, particularly by slate loueries, have been 
directed at these target groups. lS I As Jesse Jackson has highlighled, "[t]he 
new chains of slavery happen to be credit cards and louery tickets, ... :' 
Jackson 's key to achieving King's dream was "teaching our people to go from 
the louery to the market-from gambling boats to board rooms ... :,m tn a 
specific example involving casinos, a 1995 Wisconsin report concluded that, 
"[w]ithout considering the social costs of compulsive [i.e., pathological] 
gambling, the 'rest-of-the-state' areas lose--or, transfer in-5223.94 million 
to the local gaming areas. Considering the lowest estimated social costs of 
problem gambling. the rest of [Wisconsin] loses $318.61 million to 
gambling."m This report also concluded that without casino gambling, many 
local citizens would have increased participation in other "outside" activities. 
The report commented that "[ m]ore than J 0% of the locals would spend more 
on groceries if it were not for the casino, while nearly one-fourth would spend 
more on clothes. Thiny-seven percent said that their savings had been 
reduced since the casino had opened .... "ISol 
From the business perspective, businesses are not na'jve. For example, 
"in a rare public stand on a controversial political issue, the Greater 
Washington Board of Trade's 85-member board voted unanimously 
147. Compau id. with Follow rht Mo"er. supra notc 73. 
148. Stephen F. Simurda. wilt-" Gambling CO'MS fO TOM'Il. 10 COWM. J. REV. 36, 37-38 (1994). 
149. Su gcncroll)' Folw.., lhe M~. supra note 73, 
1.50. Suo t., .. CH .... lu..ESCu:nraTF.R &.PHtUPCooK. SE.I.LLN<l HOPE: STATE LoTTF.IUI!..<; IN ""'EIIIC" 
215. 222·21 (1989). 
151. Sit td. I. 99. 
152. 8ryan Srrnth. 'Wn!' CMj"s~ Shadle King's Drttlnt. CHI. SU~·nMF_<;' Jan. 19. 1999. I. 10. 
153. WIUJAM ntOMI'SON ET AL.. TIiE Eco~OMJC l",PACl" OF NATIVE A~II'IUC ..... '" GAM ING L' 
W~SL'l I (1995) (cxecuuve summary). 
154. Id. 1.2.25. SuChan l infra. 
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against',m Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly's IflltlatJVe to bring casino-style 
gambling to Washington, D.C .. With the exception of the cluster services 
associated with gambling. new businesses tend not to locale in areas allowing 
legalized gambling because of onc or morc of the aforementioned COSls. U6 In 
areas saturated with legal ized gambling activities, preexisting businesses face 
added pressures that push them toward illiquidity and even bankruptcy.I S7 In 
1997, The Ballkruptcy Crisis reported that increased U.S. gambling had 
become not only the fastest growing cause ofbankruplcics but also the fouITh 
Jeadingcause. ,sa Gambling counties were experiencing 18 to 35 percem morc 
bankruptcies than non-gambling counties. 159 By 2000, these bankruptcies 
were still trending upward in gambling counties with 13 to 29 percent more 
bankruptcies than non-casino counties l60 reflected in increases ranging 
between 4 and 88 percent in gambling counties. 161 
In 2001, "244 U.S. counties that had gambling ca~inos experienced a 
bankruptcy filing rate of 6.78 per 1,000 adults,"'62 according to The New 
8atlkruprcy Epidemic. "This was 13.6% higher than the filing rate in 2,865 
counties that had no casinos in lhem" 163 Furthennorc, in "20 counties with 
five or mare casinos. the year 2000 bankruptcy rate was 7.70 per 1,000 adults, 
or 29% higher than in counties that had no casinos"l64 (SMR Research 2(01). 
More subtly, traditional businesses in communities that initiate legalized 
gambling activities can anticipate increased personnel costs due to increased 
job absenteeism and declining productivity. I~ The best blue-collar and white-
collar workers. the TYJ!C-A personalities, are the most likely to become 
pathological gamblers. I A business with a thousand workers can anticipate 
increased personnel costs of $500,000 or more per year-simply by having 
various fonns of legalized gambling activities accessible to it~ workers.161 
155 UtSpayd&YolIIndaWoodlec TraddJoordRrjtclSDC CaJrnoPlon WASil PQsT Sept 2S 
1993. at Al (emphasis added). 
156. Su. t.g .. John W. Kindt. Tht NrgClivr Impacrs of ugali~f'd Gamblrng on Busin f'Sus. 4 U. 
MIAMI Bus. L.J. 93 (1994) lhereinafter ImpacrJ 01l Bus;nf'uj . 
157. Id. 
158. BMKRUPTCY CRISIS, JUpro note 31. at 119; Cornlalion Bf'''''un Gombl"'g Gro .. ·th OM 
Bonilrupldf'S. supra note 31 (Gambling is the fastesl gro"'101 and fourth leadllli CIIllSe of U.S. 
bankruptcies.). 
159. BAN KRUPTCY CRIS!S. supro note 37, al 119. 
160. BAlliKRUPTCY EPIDEMIC. ,upro l10Ie 3g. at 2()6..(}7. 
161. III. al 206-11 
162. Id. at 206. 
163. Id. 
164. 'd. 
1M. Su, e., .• Economic Impacts. '''pro note 124, at 9().91 tbl. 3; 90 nn. 272-74, 91 nn. 215-76. 92 
nn. 277-79. 9) nn. 280-82.. 94 nn. 28J...81. 9S nn. 289-90. 
166. 'Ii at 66~ ue alsc BIUWJS-EcononUc Impacu ofGambJing . .J\/pn2 nocc 79. II 23-24. 
167. Impacts Or! Bus/nulr.!". supro nole I S6. at III. The l"'le JOClal'IIo'elfare costs CIIu$Cd by 
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To some extent, businesses must already internalize the societal costs 
associated with assisting personnel with drug or alcohol-related problems. 
Legalizing various gambling activities increases the number of problems 
related to pathological gambling in the context of the work force. and these 
costs are reflected in increased personnel costs-such as "rehabilitation 
costs," which can easily range from $3,000 to $20.000 (or more) per 
pathological gambler, 1611 In the context of the national health care debate and 
its financing, the spectre of these unanticipated costs can raise further 
concerns to businesses already being asked to bear certain health care costs. 
VI. PoLICY AL TERNA TIVES AND RECOMMENDA nONS 
A. Education Costs 
Gambling activities and the gambling philosophy are directly opposed to 
sound business principles and economic development. Legalized gambling 
activities also negatively affect education- both philosophi cally and 
fiscally.l 69 Adherence to a philosophy of making a living via gambling 
activities nO[ only abrogates the perceived need for an education. but also 
reinforces economically unproductive activities (and is statistically impossible 
since the "house" always wins eventually). In states with legalized gambling 
activities, which were initiated arguably to bolster tax revenues to 
"education," the funding in "real dollars" has almost unifonnly decreased. l70 
Compared with other fund ing sources, lotteries have been an inefficient 
and dismal failure at supplementing educational funding. The definitive state-
by-state analysis is still a 1996 comprehensive analysis, which concluded that 
"states sell lotteries as a painless substitute for taxes-and a way to raise 
money for good causes like education. But an exclusive ... investigation 
reveals that lottery states collect more in taxes and spend less on schools than 
stales that go without the games.,,171 
Ielllli;dnllamblinllClivilies are necessarilyrtflected 10somc atenl in the: WQrkf~. Su lrifro llOIes 93· 
129 and acrompanylnl te.lI. f'Qreumple, Iosl WQrk prOOl,lt'livi ty llonehas been calculated II $23,CKlO per 
Yelr per patholog)clllamb1er. Suo t., .. BETlERGoV'T Assoc:.,STAFFWHTTE PAPER: CASINOGAM8UN(; 
lNCHICACiO 14· 15 ( 1992)(1 comprc:hen5ive report) [hereinafter BOA REPORT] , TheCOStS ofl "bottomed 
out" pathologicl l gambler arc: signifICantly higher. rd. al 14 ($27.000 per pIl\holo&ica1IambJer"): luullo 
GAM8LING AODICTION IN MARYLANO. IUpro note 34. al 59-61 (approx.imately $ 15.000 per yellf per 
palhologieaJ 'Imbler in l05t productivity). 
168 E.cOllQmic Impacls. supro lIOte 124. al 65 n.I OS & 67 n. 126: JU, t .,., GAM8UNG AOOICTJOI" 
t .. MARYLAND.lllpro nOlo:: 14. al 29-30. 36-63 (l990); BGA REPQRT.IIIPro note 167. at 12-
169 Suo ... , .• CLorFaT'ER & COOK. Iaprtl nOle 150. II lSI-53; BGA RIlPORT.IIIPro note 167. 
App Q 
170. SuPetetKcalinA. l..ofJoF"W!f: W .. AflLDu!. MONIn' . May 1996.11 142, 144-4S, 
171 Su id. 
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The facl thai loueries hurt overall education funding is so basic it is in 
every U.S. grade school library,1n Despite these facts, the public and 
numerous educators are being misled by relendess taxpayer-supported louery 
advenising. Harvard Professor Bridget Long has severely criticized Georgia's 
advertising of its lonery's flagship program, the Hope scholarships, as 
discriminatory against minorities and poor people. III Furthermore. after 
Georgia began its lonery in 1993, the number of teenagers who became 
pathological (addicted) gamblers and problem gamblers soared within three 
years from a minor problem up to include 4 to 17.3 percent of all teenagers, 
which were problematic and alarming numbers well above the national 
average. 174 Like the illegal drugprobJcm, gambling ha .. hooked large numbers 
of teenagers. Throughout the U.S. studies, the numbers of pathological and 
problem teenage gamblers are double the adult rates, indicating that gambling 
legislators have doubled the addiction problems for the next generation and 
prompting criticisms that the Georgia lottery' s "Hope is Dope." m 
B. The Pathological Gambler Problem 
States. which embrace legalized gambling aChvities. can expect 
enormous socioeconomic costs and a decline in the quality of life. Unlike 
traditional business activities, legalized gambling activities cater to a market 
consisting of addicted and potentially addicted consumers. and most 
preexisting businesses will find it quite difficult to compete for "consumer 
dollars" which are being transformed into "gambling dollars .•. 17to For example, 
the field research strongly suggests that the introduction of widespread 
legalized gambling in South Dakota, including casinos and video lottery 
terminals (VLTs), over a two·year time span caused a 1.0 percent increase in 
the number of problem and probable pathological gamblersl77-a rccofnized 
addictive behavior pursuant to the American Psychiatric Association. 17 Each 
newly-created pathological gambler has been conservatively calculated tocost 
society $13.200 to $52,000 per year (with wider ranges between $10.000 and 
$80,000 per year). 119 These costs are not just reflected in society as a whole 
172. Suo e.g., WOfl.LO BOOK £NcyCWPEDlA Y EARBOOK 398·400 (1994). 
173. Tan. Tut:kwiller. SclwuJrJhip Propo.uJ CriliciZJ!d: Plan DlHs Not Help Tlwu Who Nud II 
Most, 56,s £CoNJmiIl, THE SUNDAY GAzETTE MAIL, Mar. 25. ZOOI. at B I, 
174. Charie5 Waltson. TullS Ul}'ing Th~jr FItIUr~1 (}fIlh~ iJM, AlV.HTA I., Feb. 25. 1996. al 04. 
J 75. Su, ~.g., id. ; HARVAADADOICTlOSS META-ANALYSIS. suprrl note 11. 
176. Su g~MmU, /mpocu 0tI8usin~sus. SMpf'Q note 156. 
177. £CottO/me Impocu, ,upro IlOIC 124. at 73·75. 
178. AM. i'sYCHIATIUC ASS'N, DIAGSOSTIC ASOSTAnsTICAI. MANUAL()!: Mb ..... AL DISORI>fJt.~ I 
312.2], It 617·18 (41h cd. 19(4). 
179. Suo ~.g .. CEO REPoKT.lllpra nOle 22. aI61-63; Potitzatt II., lupm note 118: BGA REPollT. 
IIIpm DOle 167. at 14; I" olso GAMBUNG ADOICnON L~ MAJ!;VLANO. Rpm note 34. The more m::enl 
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but impact on all businesses. In panicular. small businesses could easily 
experience disproportionate negative impacts, and unlike large corporations, 
small businesses would be less likely to have the asset base necessary to 
cushion against those negative impacts. 
Sociologists almost unifonnly report that increased gambling activities, 
which are promoted as sociologically "acceptable" (the acceptability faclor), 
and which are made "accessible" (the accessibility factor) to large numbers of 
people, will increase the number of pathological gamblers as part of the 
population. which begins at .77 percent as reported by the 1976 U.S. 
Commission on Gamb1ing. '~o Since gambling has been legalized and made 
accessible in several stales, the range has increased to 1.5 105 percent in those 
states. lSI This phenomenon was specifically confirmed by a 1995 study which 
concluded that (he lifetime probable pathological and problem gamblers in 
Iowa increased from 1.7 percent of the public in 1989 to 5.4 percent in 
1995.182 Similarly, a limited study of Native Americans revealed a rate for 
lifetime probable pathological and problem gamblers of 14.5 percent in casi no 
areas. III These developmems translated into increases in socioeconomic costs 
which must be addressed and absorbed primarily by taxpayers,lM bm also by 
businesses, charities. social-welfare organizations, and governmental units. 
C. Negative Impact on lob Creation 
On a regional level, the combined ranges of these various socioeconomic 
costs are so large that they tend (0 dwarf the localized economic positives. l15 
These drains on society could easily translate into a net loss of thousands of 
jobs on a statewide or regional level. 186 Furthermore, it can be argued that the 
combined economic positives and negatives result in a negative economic 
estimales are lending to clusterin the range of$13,200 10 $35.000 (wilhout adjusting for inflat ion). Even 
the Jowcsl estimates reflect large social·",'Clfare costs. which should be comparo:! with IIny t1eW tax revenues 
fmm legaliting form5 of g.mbling activities. In mOIil inslances. an increase of OtleCCf1 t or less (0259(,) in 
the nics lU. WOIlIeI raise more lilt revenues than ttle local of. Itate' s projected revenues from Jegali7.ed 
gambling activities . 
180. U.S. COMJo.!'N G ... MIILINO. Il jpra nOie 75, al 73 (another 2.33 percenl equal "potential" 
palholo,icalgllmblen). Su Chan l infra. 
III . SUo ~., .. AU .... l.On'ERtES & GAMINO,GAMBUNO AND PRoaLEM G ... .\II:lUNO mAulERT ... 18 
(Jan. 1994) (heremafter ALT"- GAMOU'i'oJ (1urnmarizing 20 studies sbowing the mlge of problem and 
probIble patboJoJlcailamblcn at 1.7 to 6.9 percent for adulu and 3.6 10 12.4 pc:rccnt ror aOoksccnts). 
182. Jo\I,'A DEP'T HU~AN SERVS .• G ... MOUo'i'O """D PROBLEM GAMBLING IN lOw ... ; A REPlXATJON 
SURVEY. 31 tbl. 11 (Jul), 28. 1995); lU Qbo William Petto5b. Study: MOt? Gambl~n in J~opDrdy. 
DEs MOINES Roo .• AUI. 25. 1995. at AI . 
In. Se~ ALTA GAM8UNO.luprQ note 181. al 18. 
1&4. Su. ~., .. Gamhl.1I1 !Wbs.di;.ed, supra note 1.11160-68. 
185. Su. e.,., SUBSIDY. MONOPOLY. G .... "BUSG. SIIpru IK*: 81..t ES-1. 
186. [d. 
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multiplier. 1" From the perspective of business-economics and strategic 
development, major businesses are and should be concerned with the trend 
toward expanding various forms of legalized gambling activities. Among 
other reasons, non·gambling related businesses will not be competing for 
consumer dollars or recreational dollars on a "'evel playing field" because 
legalized gambling activities can caterla an addicted and potentially addicted 
market segment. 
Since the U.S. economy and most state economies are extensive in scope. 
the socioeconomic negatives associated with legalized gambling activities can 
remain hidden for long periods of time. However, just because a particular 
activity is "legalized" by a state government docs not mean the negative 
business or societal impacts have been eliminated--or even reduced. 
Vil CONCLUSION 
Apparently oblivious to charges of conflict of interest. the "membership" 
of the American Gambling Association (AGA), the Washington-based 
lobbying group, was advertised during the beginning of the 21st century as 
including ftnns such as Arthur Andersen. These firms were often employed 
by the AGA andlor pro-gambling interests to promulgate information 
supportive of pro-gambling agendas (compare Appendices I and II). 
However, taxpayers and businesses were increasingly beginning to 
rea1ize that, as Professor Jack Van Der Slik has summarized for much of the 
academic community. state-sponsored gambling "produces no product, no new 
wealth, and so it makes no ... contribution to economic development." '" 
Business-economic history supported this proposition. The recriminalization 
of gambli ng activities occurred one hundred years ago after a brief gambling 
boom following the Civil War. Most state legislatures utilized constitutional 
provisions to recriminalize gambling because lawmakers wanted to make it as 
difficult as possible for future generations to ex.periment with the class ic 
"boom and bust" cycles and the concomitant socioeconomic negatives 
occasioned by legalized gambling activities. To paraphrase Georg Hegel's 
common quote, "those who forget the lessons of economic history are 
condemned to relive them." l8~ 
117. Suo ~.I .• CEO REPORT. IWpro. nOle 22, at so. 
188. Jack Van Der Silk, ugaliud Gmnblillg: Prtdarory Policy. h.L IssuEs, Mar. 1990,,, 30. 
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CHART I: B US INESS ECONOMICS OF LICENSED ORGANIZED GAMBLING 
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Increased Bankruptcy Rates for 2000 in Casino Counties· 
Analyzed Analyzed Higher 
Counties Counties Bankruptcy 
With Casinos Without Casinos Rates in Counties 
State With Casinos 
California 21 37 20% 
Florida 14 53 16% 
Illinois 7 95 10% 
Indiana 8 85 4% 
Iowa II 88 49% 
Louisiana 9 55 18% 
Missouri 8 107 50% 
Washington 24 15 20% 
Wisconsin 14 58 88% 
The filing rale in Nevada's casino counties is about three limes the rate in the 
counties without casinos. 
. 
• Source: SMR R~EARCH CORP .• THE B ........ KRUPTCy EPlDE.'-ITC 2{)I)· tl (2001 ), 
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ApPENDIX r-
For the MedJa: American Gaming Association (AGA) 
Members List, March 11, 1999 
As a Member of the American Gaming Association, 
Your Voice is Heard in Washington 
A&O Scenery 
A&H Supply 
Ace USA. Inc . 
Acres Gaming, Inc. 
Alliance Gaming Corporation 
American Fish & Seafood Co. 
Andersen Dairy, Inc. 
Argosy Gaming Corporation 
Arthur Andersen & Co" LLP 
Austin Hardwoods 
AZLar Corporution 
8. K. Entertainment 
Bear Industries Printing and Publishing 
Bear Stearns & Company, Inc. 
Bearing Belt Chain Company, Inc. 
Best Manufacturing Inc. 
BclZ Water Management Group 
Boyd Gaming Corporation 
Brady Industries 
Caesars World. Inc. 
California Card Club Association 
Cashman Equipment 
Casino Association of Louisiana 
Casino Owners Association of Colorado 
Chase Products Co. 
Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Las 
Vegas 
Collins Produce. Inc. 
Deadwood Gaming Association 
Deloiue & Touche LLP 
Desert MeaLS & Provisions 
Douwe Egberts Coffee Systems 
Dynamic Carpet Inc. 
Eldorado Hotel Casino 
Ethel M. Chocolates 
Game Financial Corporation 
Gaming Association of Iowa 
GEM Communications (lGWBfCasino 
ExecutivefWGC) 
Global Cash Access 
Gounnct Foods. Inc. 
Greal China Industrial 
Grcektown Casino. LLC 
GTECH 
Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. 
Harveys Casino Resorts 
Hawaiian Resources 
Hinkley & Schmitt, Inc. 
Hollywood Casino Corporation 
Hollywood Park (BoomlownfCasino 
Magic) 
Horseshoe Gaming, Lnc. 
Illinois Casino Gaming Association 
Indiana Gaming Association 
Innovative Gaming. Inc. 
International Game Technology 
Isle of Capri Casinos. Inc. 
JCM American Corporation 
Kelly's Pipe & Supply Co .• Inc. 
Lady Luck Gaming Corporation 
Marietta Corporation 
~ Am. Gaming Assoc .. For Ihe M~dia: M~mMr LiJrillg (Oct. 14. 1999). at hllp:fI ......... . 
amcricangammg.OfJ/mahalldilYoorVoicelindex.hlml (members as of Mar. I I. 1999). 
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Mcllano & Company 
MOM Grand, Inc. 
Mikohn Gaming Corporation 
Mirage Resons. Inc. 
Mission indllslries 
Mississippi Gaming Association 
Missouri Riverboat Garning Association 
Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc. 
Marrey Distributing Company 
Mountaineer Race Track & 
Gaming Resort 
Nevada Beverage Company 
Nevada Gaming Publishing 
Nevada Resort Association 
Office Depot Park Place Entertainment. 
Inc. 
Pepsi-Cola Company 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Primadonna Resorts, Inc. 
Regency Service Cans, Inc. Sahara 
Hotel & CasinoSeven Circle 
Resorts. Inc. 
Shuffle Master Gaming 
Sobel Weslex 
Southern Wine & Spirits or Nevada 
Sparklctts Drinking Water 
Station Casinos. Inc. 
Steelman Interiors. Inc. 
Stock Yards Packing Company 
Sturgeon Electric Company, Inc. 
Sun International Hotels Ltd. 
The Sieb Organization, Inc. 
U. S. Foodscrvicc - Las Vegas 
Universal Flooring. Inc. 
VLC, Inc. 
Watkins Ludlam & Sfennis P.A. 
Wei 'n Wild Nevada, Inc. 
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APPENDIX II' 
American Gaming Association (AGA) Members List, 
August 27, 2001 
Casinos & Equipment Manufacturers 
Ameristar Casinos. lnc. 
Argosy Gaming Corporation 
Aristocrat Technologies, Inc. 
Atronic Americas LLC 
Aztar Corporation 
Boyd Gaming Corporation 
Eldorado HOIeI and Casino 
Harrah's Entertainment. inc. 
Ho llywood Casino Corporation 
Horseshoe Gaming Holding Company 
International Game Technology 
Isle of Capri Casinos. Inc. 
Kerzer International Rcsons Ltd. 
Kunzmi Gaming inc. 
Mandalay Resort Group 
MOM MIRAGE 
Mikohn Gaming Corporation 
Park Place Entertainment Corporation 
Penn National Gaming, Inc. 
Pinnacle Entertainment 
Station Casinos. Inc. 
Sun Intcrnational Hotels Ltd. 
Wynn Resons, LLC 
Financial Services 
Bank of America 
Bear Steams & Company, Inc. 
CISC World Markets 
Watkins Ludlam & Stennis PA 
Suppliers & Vendors 
A & H Supply 
A&D Scenery, Tne. 
American Fish & Seafood Co. 
Andersen Dairy, Inc. 
Bearing Belt Chain Company. Inc. 
Best Manufacturing, Inc. 
Belz Water Management Group 
Brady Industries, Inc, 
Carta Mundi 
Cashman Equipment Company 
Chase Products Co. 
Chesapeake Advertising, Inc. 
Coca·Cola Bottling Company of 
Las Vegas 
Douwe Egberts Coffee Systems 
Ethel M. Chocolates 
Game Financial Corporation 
Global Cash Access 
Great China Industrial rnc. 
Hawaiian Resources 
Innovative Gaming, Inc. 
JCM American Corporation 
Mariella Corporation 
Mellano & Company 
Morrey Distributing Company 
Nevada Beverage Company 
Office Depot 
Raffeny & Associates 
Prime Table Games 
Shuffle Master Gaming 
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Professional Services 
Arthur Andersen & Co., LLP 
Deloine & Touche LLP 
Greektown Casino, LLC 
Lionel Sawyers & Collins 
PricewatcrhouscCoopers 
Sierra Springs/Hinkley & Schmitt, Inc. 
Southern Wine & Spirits ofNcvada 
Sparldeus Drinking Water 
• Am. Gaming Msoc .• About (h~ AGA, M"",bus Lul;"g (Aug. 27, 2001). al hnp:l/w,""w. 
amc:ncan,IlfT\lIlI·(Iri/.bouLlgalmanber_lAtfmembc.-s.c(m. 
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The Paul Steelman Design Group, Inc. 
Wet '0 Wild Nevada. Inc. 
Wo rld Gaming Network 
Pari.J\{utueVSports Book 
Mountaineer Race Track & Gaming 
Resort 
Associations, Publications & Unions 
California Gaming Association 
Casino Association of Indiana 
Casino Association of Louisiana 
Casino City Press 
Casino Owners Associalion of 
Colorado 
Casino Promote 
Ill inois Casino Gaming Association 
Iowa Gaming Association 
Michael Po llock 's Gaming Industry 
Observer 
Mississippi Gaming Association 
Missouri Riverboat Gaming 
Association 
Nevada Resort Association 
